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Not What You Give, But Who You Choose: Evolutionary Strategies for Political Retention in Multi-Agent Systems

Year: 2025

Term: Winter

Student Name: Victor Li

Supervisor: Alan Tsang

Abstract: Why do some leaders lose power despite delivering prosperity, while others retain office through periods of instability? This thesis investigates that paradox using an agent-based simulation grounded in selectorate theory, developed by Bueno de Mesquita et al. The model explores how leaders allocate limited resources to maintain power by varying the size of the selectorate and winning coalition. Unlike traditional models, this framework introduces heterogeneous citizen groups with differing valuations of public goods and simulates strategic competition between an incumbent and a challenger. Each proposes tax and spending policies to win support from a selectorate. Results show that leaders relying on small coalitions tend to allocate private goods to secure loyalty and remain in power for more extended periods. In contrast, those governing large coalitions invest more in public goods but face higher turnover rates. Ultimately, the findings suggest that political survival depends not on the resources delivered, but on how institutional structures are manipulated to minimize the cost of maintaining support.